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No. 51177-1-II <br />individualized inquiry into the need to restrain Jackson, it determined that, as a matter of superior <br />court policy, all criminal defendants would be restrained during pretrial proceedings without any <br />consideration of motions for removal of restraints. <br />Similarly, the trial court failed to conduct any analysis as to the need to restrain Jackson <br />with a leg brace during trial. The trial court did not apply any of the Hartzog factors. Rather, the <br />court simply stated that it did not see "anything inappropriate" about the leg brace. RP at 75. <br />The failure to conduct any inquiry into the need to restrain Jackson, and the broad adoption <br />of jail policy for all criminal defendants in pretrial proceedings, was clearly in violation of well - <br />established constitutional law. <br />D. HARMLESS ERROR <br />Having established that the superior court violated Jackson's constitutional right to due <br />process, we next determine whether the decision to restrain Jackson was harmless beyond a <br />reasonable doubt.' See Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 859. For erroneous restraints to be reversible rather <br />than harmless error, the record must show that the restraints "had a substantial or injurious effect <br />or influence on the jury's verdict." Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 888. <br />' Jackson argues that the superior court's systemic refusal to conduct the requisite individual <br />inquiry before shackling Jackson, and other criminal defendants appearing in Clallam County <br />Superior Court, constitutes structural error and is not subject to a harmless error analysis. "A <br />structural error resists harmless error review completely because it taints the entire proceeding." <br />State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 725, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006). Such structural errors include total <br />denial of counsel, a biased trial judge, racial discrimination in jury selection, denial of self - <br />representation at trial, and denial of a public trial. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 <br />S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991). "Each of these constitutional deprivations is a similar <br />structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an <br />error in the trial process itself" Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. Jackson provides no authority to <br />support the extension of the structural error doctrine to shackling, and we decline to do so for the <br />first time here. <br />10 <br />22 <br />