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No. 51177-1-II <br />The superior court has the discretion to provide for courtroom security to ensure the safety of court <br />officers, parties, and the public. Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 394. <br />In order to balance the interest in courtroom security and defendants' constitutional right <br />to due process, the superior court must determine the extent to which courtroom security measures <br />are necessary based upon facts set forth in the record. Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 394. "The <br />trial court should allow restraints only after conducting a hearing and entering findings on the <br />record sufficient to justify their use on a particular defendant." Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 394. <br />The trial court must perform an individualized inquiry into the necessity for pretrial and trial <br />restraints. Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 395. <br />The Supreme Court has identified several factors that the trial court should consider when <br />deciding whether a defendant should be restrained during trial: <br />"[T]he seriousness of the present charge against the defendant; defendant's <br />temperament and character; his age and physical attributes; his past record; past <br />escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to <br />harm others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob <br />violence or of attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other <br />offenders still at large; the size and mood of the audience; the nature and physical <br />security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative <br />remedies." <br />State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d 863, 887-88, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998) (quoting Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d <br />at 400). <br />A trial court commits constitutional error when it fails to exercise its discretion. See State <br />v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 775, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) ("[W]here no balancing or analysis as to the <br />need to restrain [the defendant] was done, his shackling was constitutional error."). Deferring to <br />general jail policy is an abuse of discretion and constitutional error. Lundstrom, 6 Wn. App. 2d at <br />W <br />