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HomeMy WebLinkAboutFS 2007-01-16 Item 2G - Report - December 14 Windstorm After Action Report INFORMATIONAL MEMORANDUM To: Mayor Mullet From: Emergency Management Directo~ January 10, 2007 Date: Subject: December 14th Windstorm After Action Report ISSUE: Discuss fmdings and recommendations stemming from the December 14,2006 windstorm. BACKGROUND: A windstorm struck the City during the late evening hours of December 14th and continued into the early morning hours of December 15,2006 causing significant portions of the City to be without power and telephone service. The high winds caused downed trees, snapped utility poles, roof damage, and twenty different City streets to be impassable. DISCUSSION: The National Incident Management System (NIMS) requires each agency to conduct an After Action Review in order to: 1. Document the response activities; 2. Identify successes/problems during emergency operations; and 3. Make recommendations to improve mitigation, response, and recovery activities. Overall the City and its residents were lucky - just a loss of power and no significant damage to structures. There were no storm-related injuries. Response and recovery operations went very well. City roads and services were restored within three days. The City did an excellent job in planning, responding, and recovering from the windstorm. This third event for 2006 once again proved that as long as the First Responder Team is able to handle an incident, the residents and this City are in capable hands. However, Tukwila's residents are totally unprepared to shelter in place for any length of time. The City's decision to implement a Citizen's Emergency Response Team program should help the residents become better prepared. The City itself is unprepared for a sustained, major disaster that would require full mobilization of its emergency management organization. RECOMMENDATION: For discussion. <it} 50 CITY OF TUKWILA ='l:~~~~. ",>~-*"'f'~ DECEMBER 2006 WINDSTORM After Action Review Tukwila, Washington January, 2007 INTRODUCTION This After Action Review is a follow up to the City Tukwila's response to the windstorm of December 14th and 15th 2006. After the windstorm, discussions were held and information sought from key personnel and departments as related to mitigation, response and recovery activities during the event. The function of this After Action Review is: (1) document response activities; (2) identify problem/successes during emergency operations; and (3) make recommendations to improve mitigation, response, and recovery activities in regards to the windstorm. A plan of action will need to be developed to implement recommended improvements. SITUATION ANALYSIS A windstorm struck the City during the late evening hours of December 14, 2006 and continued into the early morning hours of December 15,2006 causing significant portions ofthe City to be without power and telephone service. The high winds caused downed trees, snapped utility poles, roof damage, and 20 different City streets to be impassable. See attached photographs. In the old Tukwila Hill area, neighborhood of S. 149th Street, cedar roof shakes were observed imbedded in the side of a neighbor's house 300-feet away from the house that lost the shakes. Houses in this neighborhood appeared to suffer the most roof damage. The Ryan Hill area incurred mostly tree damage and downed power lines - primary lines that supplied the Bangor Street substation. Initially, a downed tree blocked access to a large portion of this neighborhood. The tree was cleared from the roadway and for the majority access was restored. The hardest hit neighborhoods were Riverton, Foster, Thorndyke, and Crestview. Over 16 individual power poles were snapped in half, split or downed. Primary power was lost to the neighborhoods because of these damaged poles. Several homes had uprooted trees and several had fallen on homes. The Cascade and Allentown neighborhoods had some damage and lost their power. The business district had minimal damage and did not lose power or had it restored within hours. The one exception was Southcenter Parkway from the 16400 block to S. 180th Street. Power was not restored for several days. With the loss of power, the Fire Department had an increase in the number of Automatic Fire Alarms and Sprinkler Water Flow Alarms being activated. The standby batteries for these systems fail after 24 to 48 hours. Also the dry fue sprinkler systems lose air pressure. Because of downed trees and storm debris, the City had a total of twenty streets (20) that were impassable. By Saturday evening, 17 streets had been reopened. The three worst affected areas were 42nd Avenue South/So 158th Street, 42nd Avenue South/So l3ih Street, and S. 146th Street Gust east of 42nd Avenue South). 5 / The loss of power also meant that signalized intersections were "dark." Because the business district did not lose power, except for Southcenter Parkway, and people were still shopping for the upcoming holidays, 14 separate "dark" intersections were placed into full operation. Backup batteries were replaced every 2 hours - a signal will fully operate on a battery for approximately 2-hours versus 10-hours if placed into a flash mode. Two major intersections caused major backups - 1-5 offramp/Southcenter Blvd; and Grady Way/West Valley Highway. These intersections are controlled by WSDOT and their policy is to leave an intersection dark during loss of power. "Warming Centers" were established at the Tukwila Community Center and Tukwila Pool. People could go to those facilities and take hot showers and get warm. The Red Cross opened several shelters across the county. Residents seeking up-to-date information on shelters were directed to contact the Red Cross Shelter Hotline at 205-3764. King County Office of Emergency Management established a Citizen Damage Report Hotline, 1-800-523-5044, for all King County residents to report their losses. Residents reporting damages were asked to provide the following information: . Name and address of the affected property . Description of the damage . Personal estimate of uninsured losses, and . Estimates of the fair market value of damaged homes or businesses. Damages to detached garages and storage buildings, secondary homes and recreational homes were not to be reported. PURPOSE The objective of the after action review is to evaluate: 1. The Emergency Operations Center 2. Field Operations 3. Shelter Operations 4. Communications 5. Adequacy of City Facilities The scope of the review is for the windstorm on December 14th and 15th and events leading up to and the weeks thereafter. The review will be confined to City response operations and will not address the response ofPuget Sound Energy, Seattle City Light, Qwest, Comcast, or any other utility company. The methodology used in performing this review is data obtained from the actual event. 5;} ii FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Emen!ency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center was not activated. The City's All Hazard Emergency Management Plan has established ''triggers'' for activating the Emergency Operations Center. Even though the windstorm was a major and significant regional event, the Public Works Department was the lead first responder team member that had primary response tasking. Public Works handled the response effort with help from Parks and Recreational personnel. The Fire Department responded to 255 incidents during the period of December 14 through December 21,2006, of which 79 were storm related. No assistance was sought from outside agencies. All three first responder team members (Fire, Police, and Public Works) coordinated damage information among the three departments and with the utility companies. Standard, day-to-day operating procedures were employed. The Mayor was kept personally informed and received daily updates on the situation by the Public Works Director. A Situation Report was sent to the City Council. Recommendation 1. Explore the possibility of adding two different categories within the Level One Activation Scale - Monitoring and Stand By. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this recommendation. Triggers for EOC activation should be reviewed and expanded if needed. Responsible Department: Emergency Management. Input from Fire, Police, and Public Works. Field Operations Overtime costs for Public Works and Fire Department exceeded $15,000. The Public Works Department prepared for the storm by holding crews within the City at the close of business on the evening of December 14th. Callbacks were made in the early hours of December 15th. Recovery operations to include debris removal, street clearing, traffic sign replacement, and street sweeping operations began immediately. Public Works crews were augmented with personnel from Parks and Recreation. A total of20 streets were impassable because of downed trees and utility poles. Barricades and advance-warning signs were installed to protect the public from encountering downed power lines. It was a constant problem to keep the barricades and signs in place. The traveling public was constantly removing the signs and barricades because motorists did not want to be inconvenienced by fmding an alternate route. First responder personnel were constantly warning residents to stay away from downed trees and power lines. 53 iii 24-hour operations were in place until Sunday evening, December I ih. Debris cleanup was completed by December 31 st - two complete circuits (street-by-street) of all city streets have been made to chip debris left curbside by residents; Two "Chipper Days" have been held. Two more "Chipper Days" will be held for residents to bring their storm-related debris for disposal. Decision was made to maintain full signal operations at key intersections because of holiday shopping traffic. This placed a huge workload on City crews. Backup batteries (think heavy car battery) had to be replaced every tv,'o hours. As soon as all batteries had been installed, the crews had to start over again. Two problem intersections caused significant backups - Off-ramp from 1-5 onto Southcenter Blvd and the Grady WayAVest Valley intersection. Both intersections are WSDOT controlled and their policy is to leave an intersection "dark" when there is a loss of power. Because of the dark signal at the 1-5 off-ramp, backups were observed onto 1-5. Fire Department had only four people respond to a recall because of impassable roads in other communities. Fire Department responded to 255 service calls, 79 were storm related, during this period. No assistance was sought from outside agencies. Recommendations 1. Put in place a safety policy that restricts City personnel from performing any field operations when sustained wind speeds exceed 45 mph. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this recommendation. Unless absolutely necessary, First Responders should not place themselves in danger. Responsible Department: Emergency Management, Fire, Police, and Public Works. 2. Explore the cost of purchasing a system that can be installed in the Signal Maintenance Shop for charging the signal backup batteries. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this recommendation. Signal crews will be able to manage the workload and more effectively respond to an emergency situation. Responsible Department: Public Works 3. Even though Pacific Pride did not lose power and city vehicles were able to refuel without incident, the backup system to pump fuel when power is lost should be tested. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this 5~ iv Recommendation. Responsible Department: Public Works 4. Explore better communication methods with Seattle City Light and Puget Sound Energy. Management Response: Both Fire Department and Public Warks provided the utility companies with damage assessment information. This helped the utility companies with the ordering of poles, transformers, etc. and it is felt expedited the recovery time. Responsible Department: Emergency Management Shelter Operations "Warming Centers" were established at the Tukwila Community Center and Tukwila Pool. Citizens could go to either facility and take a hot shower and get warm. The Red Cross was not asked to open a shelter in Tukwila, but did open several in King County - Rainier Community Shelter, Renton Highlands, West Seattle, and the Masonic Lodge in Des Moines. A total of six residents sought information on shelters and were directed to contact the Red Cross Shelter Hotline at 205-3764 or visit the Red Cross web site. The City was in contact with the Red Cross and asked that the shelters not be closed prematurely because of the prolonged power outage at Tukwila Gardens. Information was posted on the City web site about the pool and Community Center being open. During field operations, First Responders informed residents about the warming centers. Recommendation 1. Establish a City policy that addresses if and when the City will open up a City- sponsored shelter. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this recommendation. Responsible Department: Emergency Management and Parks & Recreation. 2. Provide designated staff additional training in shelter management. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this recommendation. Whether the City opens a City-sponsored shelter or assists the Red Cross, City personnel need to be better trained to provide these services. 55 v Responsible Department: Emergency Management and Parks & Recreation. Communications All First Responder communication systems functioned flawlessly during the incident. The loss of power did re-enforce the need to have sufficient charging systems available for batteries. Early Friday morning the decision was made to not open City facilities. Once staffing arrangements were solidified, the Community Center was opened on Saturday. Department Heads were contacted so that they could inform their employees. Despite the effort some employees were not informed that facilities were closed on Friday. As the power outage continued, Tukwila's residents became frustrated with the lack of solid information coming from the utility companies. First Responders were keeping the utility companies fully informed as to the problems and areas without power. Yet when residents called the utility companies, residents were told that this is the first the company knew that a specific neighborhood was without power. Because of this information void and lack of consistency in the quality of the information, residents began to take their frustrations out on City employees for not keeping them informed and for not telling the power company of the problems. The extended power outage also re-enforced the fact that Tukwila's residents are not prepared. The majority of residents do not know what to do in times of an emergency and are unprepared to take care of themselves and their families. Recommendations 1. Establish a phone number that City employees may call to see if City facilities will be open. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs. Responsible Department: Public Works. Action completed. Employees ,,,ill be able to call the number in times of emergency. An automated message will be activated by Public Works. The number will be given to employees in an all-user email. 2. Explore methods to keep the public better informed of the situation within the City. 5~ Management Response: Even though the request is a backlash response because of the power companies' poor performance in keeping their customers informed, it will provide an opportunity for the City to improve its communication capabilities with the public. vi Responsible Department: Emergency Management, Public Information Officer, Mayor, City Council, Tukwila citizens. Adequacy of City Facilities With the loss of power the City's capability to provide essential services were strained. Fire Station 51 and the Community Center did not lose power. All other facilities were without power. Only three facilities within the City have backup power generators - City Hall which is limited and cannot carry the full electrical load needed for heat, lights, computer servers, telephones, etc.; Fire Station 51, and the Emergency Operations Center (Golf Maintenance Facility). City Hall's backup generator cannot carry the full load. Hence there is no heat for the building and the Police Department staff that must be present twenty-four hours a day. Nor can the generator provide enough power for the City's telephone and computer system. Neither will work until power is restored. The backup generator's transfer switch had a loose connection that caused some of the wiring to overheat and had to be shut down. A portable generator was brought in, but it meant for a couple of hours while the switch was being repaired that the Police Department was without the capability to perform critical functions. Only Fire Station 51 had power. The lack of standby power at Stations 52, 53, and 54 meant that Station 52 could not be manned and Engine 52 was repositioned to Station 51. Station 53 was without heat, hot water, and power for 7-days. The small generator at Station 53 provides power for the bay door and minimal lighting. Station 54 faired slightly better because their power was restored within two days. Repositioning assets increases response time. Recommendations 1. Explore the feasibility of installing backup generators at all City facilities. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs. Responsible Department: Public \Vorks. Consultant contract had already been awarded before the windstorm. Final report expected by the end of January and presentations will be made to Utility Committee and Finance and Safety Committee. 2. Investigate the adequacy of all City facilities to meet the growing demand for services. Management Response: Emergency Management concurs with this recommendation. As the demand for services increases within the City, an evaluation of our facility needs is required and the best method for meeting these needs. Responsible Department: City Administrator 57 vii CONCLUSIONS Overall the City and its residents were lucky - just a loss of power and no significant damage to structures. There were no storm related injuries. Response and recovery operations went very well. City roads and services were restored by Sunday evening. The windstorm was the third event in 2006 that required emergency response and recovery efforts -Flood responses in January and November were the others. Overall the City did an excellent job in planning, responding, and recovering from the windstorm. Once again, as long as the First Responder Team is able to handle an incident, the residents and this City are in capable hands. However, Tukwila's residents are totally unprepared to shelter in place for any length of time. The City's decision to implement CERT training for its residents should help them become better prepared. The City itself is unprepared for a sustained, major disaster that would require full mobilization of its emergency management organization. The Mayor and City Council need to address the difficult question of how to staff and fund the program. There are items in this report that will need individual committee attention and City Council action before this report is closed. Many things remain to be accomplished before this City is prepared to respond to a major disaster. Even though this report has addressed just the City's response to the windstorm, it is felt that there are many issues that involve the private sector that need to be addressed by Council because of the effect those issues have on the expectations of our citizens. Examples are: · Private businesses that are engaged in providing "Assisted Care", should they be required to have backup power generation and have the capability to take care of their customers in times of an emergency? Or does it fall upon the City to bring in portable generators? · Gas Stations - should they also be required to have backup power generation and emergency tanks in order to serve the public? · \Vhere does one establish the difference between what is a private responsibility and a public responsibility to respond in times of a disaster? · What outreach services will the City provide versus educating our citizens as to what responsibilities they are required to perform. 5~ viii December 2006 Windstorm Photos December 2006 Windstorm Photos December 2006 Windstorm Photos December 2006 Windstorm Photos December 2006 Windstorm Photos